1959]

RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL LAW-LACK OF KNOWLEDGE AND INTENT HELD No
DEFENSE TO CRiiiTAL PROSECUTION FOR F~inuRPE To REGISTER
As Nii coTiCs ADDICT OR VIOLATOR UPON BORDER CROSSING
Defendants were tried and convicted of violating a federal statute requiring all citizens of the United States who have been convicted of violating federal or state narcotics laws or who are narcotics addicts to register
with customs officials upon entering or leaving the country.'
The trial
court refused to permit defendants to testify that they lacked both knowledge of the statute and intent to violate it, and that they did not perceive
any signs at the border publicizing the duty to register. The court reasoned that the statute did not make intent an element of guilt 2 and based
the convictions solely on evidence that defendants had either previously
been convicted of narcotics violations or were narcotics addicts and had
failed to register upon entering the country. The court of appeals affirmed,
rejecting the contention that the lower court erred in refusing to admit
defendants' testimony.3 Reyes v. United States, 258 F.2d 774 (9th Cir.
1958).
One of the more familiar maxims of the criminal law is that "ignorance of the law is no excuse." 4 Under the common law, where offenses
roughly corresponded to community morals and a showing of criminal
intent was required, the problem of lack of knowledge was not particularly
acute.3 But American criminal legislation throughout this century has
been marked by the increased creation of a new class of offenses, frequently
referred to as "public welfare offenses," differing from traditional commonlaw crimes in that a showing of criminal intent or mens rea is not required. 6 This development reflects a change in emphasis in the law from
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (Supp. V, 1958): "[N]o citizen . . . who is addicted
to or uses narcotic drugs . . .or who has been convicted of a violation of any of
the narcotic or marihuana laws of the United States, or of any State thereof . . .
shall depart from or enter into . . .the United States, unless such person registers.
2. Ibid.
3. The court also held that the statute was not arbitrary or capricious, nor violative of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See instant case
at 780, adopting a lengthy portion of the opinion in United States v. Eramdjian, 155
F. Supp. 914 (S.D. Cal. 1957). These issues are beyond the scope of this Comment.
4. For an examination of this common-law doctrine see CLARK & MARSHALL,
CRmizs 102-05 (5th ed. Kearney 1952) and cases collected therein.
5. See Mueller, On Common Law Mens Rea, 42 MimNN. L. REV. 1043 (1958).
6. See Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 CoLum. L. R1v. 55 (1933). See also
CLARK & MAsHALL, op. cit. supra note 4, at 60-68; Mueller, rupra note 5; cases
collected note 10 infra.
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one of punishing violators to protecting societal interests, a change deemed
necessary because of massive social, economic and technological transitions in our society with which the law has had to keep pace and rationalized by the observation that the harm to society results from the
conduct regardless of the actor's intent.7 Unfortunately, by relaxing the
traditional elements of guilt these laws present the potential of imposing
punishment upon persons who neither know of the regulation nor have
reason to know of it, and thus have no reason to refrain from violative
conduct. 8 At the root of this problem is the unending struggle of the
law to seek an accommodation of the conflicting interests of society and
the individual. Sayre, a generation ago, advocated the soundness of
public welfare offenses so long as the penalties are small and effective
enforcement depends on wholesale prosecutions or violation leads to serious social danger. 9
The Supreme Court has repeatedly sustained the constitutional power
of legislatures to eliminate the mental element from the definition of an
offense.10 The recent decision of the Court in Lambert v. California,"
however, added a new dimension to the constitutional considerations, although the Court again recognized this power. In that case defendant,
who after a forgery conviction had lived in Los Angeles for seven years,
was convicted of noncompliance with the municipal criminal registration
law. 12 She was not permitted to testify as to her lack of knowledge of
the ordinance. Analogizing to various decisions requiring adequate notice
in civil proceedings as a matter of due process, 13 the Supreme Court
7. Sayre, supra note 6, at 67-70.

8. Knowledge of the regulation does not always alleviate the hardships of these

statutes. In some cases, vicarious liability is imposed. See, e.g., United States v.
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
9. Sayre, supra note 6, at 78. He also warned, however, that "the modern rapid
growth of a large body of offenses punishable without proof of a guilty intent is
marked with real danger. Courts are familiarized with the pathway to easy convictions by relaxing the orthodox requirement of a nisk rea. The danger is that in
the case of true crimes where the penalty is severe and the need for ordinary criminal
law safeguards is strong, courts following the false analogy of the public welfare
offenses may now and again similarly relax the ens r a requirement, particularly
in the case of unpopular crimes, as the easiest way to secure desired convictions."
Id. at 79. See Mueller, supra note 5, at 1101: "[As a]moral proposition . . .absolute liability [statutes are] immoral. .. ."
10. E.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) ; United States v.
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943) ; United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 (1922) ;
United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922). See also authorities cited notes 5, 6
supra. Normally the issue is one of statutory construction rather than of constitutionality. Cf. Morissette v. United States, sura. Although the power may exist,
the propriety of its exercise as represented by the instant statute seems questionable
where lengthy imprisonment may follow and the requirement of intent could have been
included in the definition of the offense seemingly without seriously impairing the
effectiveness of the statute.
11. 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
12. For a recent analysis of the problems presented by these ordinances, see
Note, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 60 (1954).
13. Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); Covey v. Town of
Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306 (1950).

RECENT CASES
reversed the conviction, emphasizing the passive nature of defendant's
conduct and holding that due process there required knowledge, or at
least the probability of knowledge, that her behavior was subject to the
regulation in question. 14 Subsequently, in affirming a conviction under
the same statute as that involved in the instant case, the Second Circuit
distinguished Lambert, reasoning that defendant's conduct was active
rather than passive and that probable knowledge was present. 15 A concurring opinion with "some concern" distinguished the cases solely on the
nature of the statutes involved. 1 6
The doctrine of the carefully worded Lambert decision is in essence
one of fair notice. Broadly speaking, it advances the doctrine that in certain
cases criminal liability may be imposed without establishing the intent of
the actor only where the persons affected by the regulation have actual
or probable knowledge of it. Precisely what will suffice to establish probable knowledge is unclear, 17 but it would seem implicit from the reasoning of the Court that when the statute is such that it will not naturally
come to the attention of those persons subject to it, reasonable steps must
be taken by means of which such persons can be made aware of the regulation. The instant court viewed Lambert as distinguishable on the
grounds that the regulation there was a mere "book-keeping device" while
the narcotics registration act was designed to prevent offenses; that while
Mrs. Lambert's act was one of nonfeasance those of the defendants in the
instant case were of misfeasance; and that the act of crossing the border
should have alerted defendants and prompted them to inquire as to the
necessity of registration.' 8 These distinctions appear unsatisfactory. Assuming the court is correct in viewing the instant statute as a crimepreventer rather than a criminal-locator, 19 focusing upon this characteristic of the statute does not obviate the necessity of adequate notice. A dis14. 355 U.S. at 229-30.

15. Defendant had accepted employment as a seaman on a ship bound for Europe
and had failed to register. Evidence indicated that signs regarding the regulation
had been posted in the area where defendant ate his meals, in -the union hall where
he obtained his job, and on his ship. He was not permitted to testify as to lack of
knowledge of the statute. United States v. Juzwick, 258 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1958).
16. Id. at 847 (Clark, J., concurring).
17. Requiring "probable knowledge" of individual defendants in each case would
suggest that a defendant could excuse himself from the operation of the statute by
showing circumstances indicating the improbability of knowledge on his part, although
the general class of persons subject to the regulation would clearly have knowledge
of it. This is contrary to the spirit of the common law and strains the notion of fair
notice. Cf. Rex v. Esop, 7 Car. & P. 456 (1836). Moreover, it would lead to the
anomalous result of one set of offenses being binding on an individual who did not
know the law when the law is generally known; and another set not being binding
on an individual who, because of individual circumstances, had no probability of
knowledge, although the general class of persons subject to the regulation had actual
knowledge. The Court probably did not mean to imply the drastic change. What
is probably meant, and this is more consistent with the notice concept, is that the
individual has probable knowledge of the statute when the general class of persons
subject to it has knowledge of its nature.
18. Instant case at 784-85.
19. The purported purpose of the statute is set out in 18 U.S.C. § 1407(a)
(Supp. V, 1958).
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tinction must be drawn between the conceded power of the legislature to
dispense with the requirement of proving intent and the obligation apparently imposed upon it by the Lambert Court of giving fair notice to the
potential defendant. The necessity of giving notice seems increased by the
fact that defendants who lack criminal intent are made subject to a long
term of imprisonment, 20 rather than decreased by the importance of regulating their conduct. Moreover, in the instant case there is presented no
problem of nationwide publicity nor of individually contacting those persons
subject to the act; notice in its most efficient form, that given at the time
and place where the offense will be committed, could be accomplished
simply by posting conspicuous signs at border crossing points. At least
where such effective means of notification are readily available, dispensing
with notice seems inconsistent with due process.
Nor do the distinctions based on the act of crossing the border appear
conclusive. If crossing without registering, as in the instant case, is somehow different from continuing to live within a city for seven years without registering, as in Lambert, characterizing one act as "misfeasance" and
the other as "nonfeasance" fails to explain the difference. The proper
inquiry would seem to be into the nature of the act in question with a
view to determining whether the performance of that act is likely to bring
21
to the attention of the defendant the requirement imposed by the statute.
Such an element appears lacking in this case. While it may be assumed
that citizens entering or leaving the country know generally that border
crossing is subject to restrictions, it is no more reasonable to expect narcotics addicts and violators to know solely from that act that they must
register as such than it is to expect convicted criminals to know that
they are required to register in a city in which they have lived for many
years. Thus, it is not sufficient to say that the act of crossing the border
itself imparts probable knowledge of the registration obligation. Notification must be found by examining the circumstances of the individual case,
such as the presence of conspicuous signs at the border or notification of
narcotics violators during their terms of imprisonment. The question of
probable knowledge then becomes a matter of fact to be determined in each
case by considering the effectiveness of the means used to give notice in
light of the effectiveness of means which might reasonably have been
used, rather than a conclusion of law to be drawn from the mere fact of
border crossing. 2 2 In the instant case defendant's testimony as to lack of
20. Failure to register is punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 or imprisonment for not less than one nor more than three years, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 1407(b)
(Supp. V, 1958).
21. Cf. cases cited note 13 supras, concerning the adequacy of notice in civil proceedings.
22. Thus the mere presence of signs or evidence of other attempts at notification
by enforcement officials will not necessarily be a sufficient basis for inferring probable
knowledge, as the court in United States v. Juzwick, 258 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1958),
apparently believed, but must be further considered in the light of all the circumstances of the case.
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knowledge of the statute and the absence of signs at the border would have
been relevant to such an examination. Although the reluctance of the
court to unduly hamper law enforcement officials in their efforts to correct
the acute narcotics evil may itself be laudable, it is regrettable that the
court did not insist upon the safeguard of notice initiated by Lambert as a
check on the imposition of absolute criminal liability where lengthy im23
prisonment may result.

FEDERAL COUIRTS--REoExTLY LIBRALIZED FEFRnnL INTERRuLs GVnFN LIMITED APPLIQABUmITY By THE
CO-URTs

LOCUToRy APPEA.s

In an attempt to alleviate some of the difficulties engendered by the
final judgment rule,' Congress in 1958 enacted the Interlocutory Appeals
Act, permitting wider use of immediate appeal from interlocutory orders.
The act provides:
"When a district judge, in making .

. . an order not otherwise
appealable . . . shall be of the opinion that such order involves a

controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for
difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order
may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he
shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals may
2
2,
thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal...
Prior to this enactment jurisdiction of the courts of appeals of the
United States to hear appeals from the district courts was generally restricted 3 to final decisions. 4 Such a rule was deemed preferable to allowing an appeal as a matter of right from every interlocutory order. The
latter approach would more likely encourage dilatory tactics, involve the
litigants in unnecessary expense, and overburden currently crowded appellate calendars. 5 Moreover, it would appear that the district courts are
usually correct and that many of those errors which are committed would
23. Much of what has been said rests on the assumption that Lambert is not and
will not become a "derelict on the waters of the law," as it was termed by Justice
Frankfurter. 355 U.S. at 232 (dissenting opinion). Compare Mueller, mipra note 5,
at 1104: "Absolute criminal liability is beginning to end in America."
1. See text accompanying notes 6, 7 infra. For a discussion of the problems
arising out of the application of the final judgment rule see generally Crick, The FiWI
Judgment Rule as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539 (1932); Note, 47 CoL.
L. RL-v. 239 (1947) ; Note, 58 YALE L.J. 1186 (1949).
2. The act further provides that application for appeal must be made to the circuit
court of appeals within ten days after entry of the order, and that a judge need not
order a stay of the proceedings in the district court. Act of Sept. 2, 1958, 72 Stat.
1770, amending 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1952). See 72 HARv. L. REv. 584 (1959).
3. But see text accompanying note 13 infra.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1952).
5. See Note, 58 Yanm L.J. 1186, 1187 (1949).
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not prove significant in view of the final determination. 6 However, there
are cases where the availability of an interlocutory appeal procedure would
expedite litigation, as well as afford greater protection to the substantive
rights of the litigants. Thus, Congress found it necessary to enact statu-.
tory exceptions to the final judgment rule, permitting interlocutory appeals
as of right in certain cases where postponement of the taking of an appeal
was likely to cause irreparable harm to a litigant. 7 Courts of appeals were
granted jurisdiction to entertain appeals from interlocutory orders (1)
granting, modifying, or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or
modify injunctions; (2) appointing receivers, or refusing to wind up
receiverships; (3) determining the rights and liabilities of the parties to
certain admiralty cases; (4) in civil actions for patent infringement which
are final except for accounting.8 As the types of cases covered by the
statutory exceptions were not exhaustive of the situations where the need
for immediate appeal existed, difficulties with the final judgment rule
persisted. An example of these difficulties can be seen in the recent case of
Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger.9 Petitioner, claiming that the
parties had previously agreed to arbitration, moved to stay a district court
proceeding. The stay was denied and petitioner's appeal dismissed by the
court of appeals. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district
court's refusal to stay the trial for arbitration was not a refusal of an
"injunction." 10

The wasteful procedure caused by the final judgment rule

was pointed out by the dissenters:
"[This case] must now go back for a court accounting trial which
could be time-consuming and expensive . . . . [S]hould petitioner
lose on the merits it could undoubtedly appeal . . . the order denying arbitration . . . . If found wrong, the trial court's judgment

on the merits would have to be vacated and the case again sent back
for determination on the merits-this time by arbitration. In that
event the trial the Court now orders will have been wholly futile.
", 11

In addition to working substantial harm to a litigant's rights, the final
judgment rule has caused extended litigation over the question of what
is "final." 12 The use of extraordinary remedies, such as writs of man6. Id. at 1186; "[M]any mistakes, apparently important at the time, will seem
to be trivial from the perspective of the final disposition of the case. . . ." Judge
Frank in Perkins v. Endicott Johnson Corp., 128 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1942), aff'd, 317
U.S. 501 (1943).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1952).
8. Ibid.
9. 348 U.S. 176 (1955). The case was widely noted. See, e.g., 69 HARv. L. R.v.
190 (1955) ; 54 MicH. L. REv. 136 (1955) ; 9 U. Mi&mi L.Q. 486 (1955).
10. 348 U.S. at 184.
11. 348 U.S. at 186.
12. Crick, supra note 1, at 557-58; Note, 58 YALE L.J. 1186, 1189-90 nn.23 & 24
(1949).
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damus, prohibition, or certiorari, have in some instances been used to escape
the harshness of the rule, but their use has been limited. 13
Since the 1958 enactment, numerous attempts have been made to
utilize its provisions. 14 In the first, Deepwater Exploration Co. v. Andrew
Weir Ins. Co.,", the district -court was asked 16 to determine whether its
order granting a transfer 17 under the doctrine of forum non conveniens
should be certified for appeal. Answering in the negative, the court found
that the legislative history of the act indicated an intention to make the
transfer or refusal to transfer a cause appealable only when there is a question about the jurisdiction or venue of the transferee court. The court
characterized such a transfer as one which might involve a controlling question of law, distinguishing its own order as a discretionary transfer.1 s In
Milbert v. Bison Labs.,'9 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dismissed an application for appeal because, contrary to the ten-day limitation of the act,20 the necessary certification of the district judge was not
made until thirteen days after entry of the order sought to be appealed
from, and the application itself was not presented to the circuit court until
twenty days after the entry. Perhaps motivated by the fact that its decision
was one of the first under the new act, the opinion of the court emphasized
by way of dictum that the legislative history showed that the act should be
used sparingly. The court concluded that the act was intended to be used
only "in exceptional cases where an intermediate appeal may avoid protracted and expensive litigation and is not intended to open the floodgates
to a vast number of appeals from interlocutory orders in ordinalry
litigation." 21

In Kroch v. Texas Co.,22 defendant moved to dismiss on the ground
that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted,
and, in the event of denial of this motion, to make the certification necessary
for appeal under the instant statute. Both motions were denied. The
13. See Crick, supra note 1, at 563; Sunderland, Tie Problem of Appellate Review,
5 TEXAs L. REv. 126, 129-31 (1926). For the possible effect of the instant statute
upon these writs see note 16 infra.
14. The most recent of these decisions at the time this comment went to press
were Berger v. United States, 27 U.S.L. W=zx 2443 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), and Corabi v.
Auto Racing, Inc., 27 U.S.L. Wani 2460 (3d ir. 1959). For a discussion of these
cases see notes 29, 33 infra.
15. 167 F. Supp. 185 (E.D. La. 1958).
16. Plaintiff corporation had petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of mandanus or prohibition after the entry of the order granting defendant's motion for a
transfer. The court of appeals, noting the recent enactment of the Interlocutory
Appeals Act, pointed out that the remedy afforded thereunder must be pursued before
consideration could be given to the issuance of an extraordinary writ. Accordingly,
the court of appeals remanded to the district court to determine whether the order
should be certified for appeal. Ex parte Deepwater Exploration Co., 260 F.2d 546
(5th Cir. 1958).
17. The order was granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1952).
18. 167 F. Supp. at 188.
19. 260 F.2d 431 (3d Cir. 1958).
20. See note 2 supra.
21. 260 F2d at 433.
22. 167 F. Supp. 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
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court pointed out that an interlocutory appeal would not have materially
advanced the ultimate termination of the litigation, since even if the court
of appeals had reversed the plaintiff would have been permitted to serve
an amended complaint. The court also stated that the questions of law
involved were not controlling, as they related merely to the form in which
the claim should be pleaded. In Bobolakis v. Compania PanamenaMaritima San Gerassimo,2 3 an action at law was brought under the Jones Act.24
Arguing that its contact with the United States was insufficient to support
jurisdiction, defendant moved for dismissal.2
Four cases in the same district had passed upon the identical issue. In two of these cases sufficient
contact had been found, 26 while in the other two cases an opposite result
was reached. 27 The district court held the contact to be sufficient and
denied the motion to dismiss. Certification to take an immediate appeal
under the new act was requested and denied. The court held that, although
the case was important in the sense that the law applicable to many other
cases would be in doubt until the issue passed on was finally decided, this
was not sufficient to certify for immediate appeal, in the absence of a
showing that immediate appeal would save defendant from the cost and
delay of protracted litigation. Alluding to the reading given the statute in
Milbert, the court concluded that the act was aimed at the "'big' and expensive case where an unusual amount of time and money may be expended
in the pre-trial phases of the case or where the trial itself is likely to be long
and costly." 28
One of the few appeals allowed to date under the new act was in United
States v. View Crest Garden Apartments, Inc.2 9 In a mortgage foreclosure
suit an order was entered constituting a determination that the rights of
plaintiff were to be governed by state instead of federal law. An application
for a receivership which might otherwise have been granted was thus denied.
The Ninth Circuit permitted the appeal and pointed out that unless the
order were reversed quickly all or a part of the fruits of the litigation would
be lost to the plaintiff. Later, in United States v. Woodbury,30 the same
23. 168 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
24. 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952).
25. The significant contact in question was the ownership by Americans of the
majority of shares of the vessel's corporate owner. 168 F. Supp. at 237.
26. Rodriguez v. Solar Shipping, Ltd., 169 F. Supp. 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1958);
Petition of Volusia Steamship Co., Ad. 188-240, S.D.N.Y., Feb. 28, 1957.
27. Mproumeriotis v. Seacrest Shipping Co., 149 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1957);
Argyros v. Polar Compania de Navegacion, Ltda., 146 F. Supp. 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
28. 168 F. Supp. at 239.
29. No. 16229, 9th Cir., Oct. 27, 1958. See also Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc., 27
U.S.L. WEEK 2460 (3d Cir. 1959). Corabi involved a wrongful death action in which
defendant contended that an administrator was appointed solely to create diversity
jurisdiction and therefore the suit should be dismissed as one in which diversity
jurisdiction was created collusively. The motion for dismissal was denied. Holding
that the motion involved a controlling question of law, an appeal from the denial was
permitted.
30. 27 U.S.L. W= 2410 (9th Cir. Feb. 16, 1959).
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court refused an appeal. In that case plaintiff moved for the production
of documents in the possession of several governmental agencies. Some of
the documents were withheld under a claim of privilege, and the court
therefore entered an order striking the Government's answer and a Government counterclaim. The court of appeals denied permission to appeal on the
ground that the question of whether the Government is entitled to the
claimed privilege was not a "controlling" question within the meaning of
the statute. View Crest was distinguished as presenting for review a question more fundamental to the determination of the case. The court, however, was careful to point out that it was not holding that a question must
be dispositive in order to be controlling.
It would appear that an opinion or two similar to the Woodbury case
by a circuit court will serve to crystallize what questions will be considered
controlling. This will help to set guide lines for both the district courts
and litigants, eventually limiting somewhat the number of appeals attempted.
However, with regard to whether an appeal may materially advance the
termination of litigation, it would seem that each case must be decided on its
own facts. Although the decision in Bobolakis was apparently correct because of the relatively short duration of trials in actions of that nature,81
the procedural setting of that case gives a good illustration of some of the
rather subtle considerations which might enter into the determination of
whether or not an appeal would materially advance the litigation. If defendant loses on the merits at the trial and appeals, a question certain to be
raised will be the sufficiency of the contact with the United States to maintain jurisdiction. Should the circuit court reverse on this issue the trial
will have been a total waste. If, on interlocutory appeal, the circuit court
upheld the district court on the jurisdiction issue, and defendant were then
to lose on the merits, it would have less reason to appeal, and if it did so
there would be one less issue facing the court. If defendant wins on the
merits after the circuit court upholds jurisdiction, the time taken to hear
the interlocutory appeal would have been wasted. To properly evaluate
these possibilities, a judge must be expected to utilize other considerations.
His experience with the particular type of lawsuit involved will give him
an indication as to the probabilities of either plaintiff or defendant winning
on the merits. He will probably have some idea whether any appeal will be
taken by the party losing on the merits. Against the possibility that the
trial may be a total waste, he must estimate how long the trial will take,
and balance this against the possibility of waste from two appeals arising
out of the same case. If the defendant, as opposed to plaintiff, appeals, the
judge might be more wary of dilatory tactics, and may at the least be more
inclined to refuse to stay the proceedings 32 after making the necessary cer31. See text accompanying note 34 infra indicating that the act should be limited
to exceptional cases. There is nothing to indicate that Bobolakis-was anything more
than a typical Jones Act negligence case.

32. See note 2 supra.
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tification. In addition there may be some differentiation to be made between
the trial court and appellate court determinations. It would seem that the
appellate court should often defer to the trial court's determination on
whether to stay the proceedings, as the trial court will be in a better position to judge the possibility of dilatory tactics. The appellate court, on
the other hand, may disregard all of the above considerations and refuse
permission to appeal because its docket congestion is such that it would
take too long to entertain the appeal. Other considerations may arise out
of the peculiarities of the individual case. For example, in Bobolakis the

issue of jurisdiction had been passed on four times in the same district
without circuit court resolution. Thus, a factor which would seem to merit
consideration is the possibility that an appeal on the same issue may have
been lodged from one of these other recent decisions.3
The cases as a whole seem to indicate a trend toward strictly limiting
the operation of the act.3 It appears clear that Congress did not intend
the 1958 statute to destroy the general applicability of the final judgment
rule. Congressional history indicates that the statute was designed to apply
only to "exceptional" cases where, because of the length or complexity
of the case, use of the final judgment rule would cause an unusual amount
of wasted effort. 35 Indiscriminate use of the statute could swamp the
courts with numerous and trivial appeals and set back, rather than expedite,
the termination of litigation. However, congressional history also shows
an expectation that the act will aid in reducing the present backlog of cases
in the federal courts.36 To the extent that this goal necessitates wider use
of the statute it is inconsistent with the intent to limit the applicability of
the statute to only exceptional cases. It is submitted that the inconsistency
is more apparent than real. As the courts grow more familiar with this new
tool, experience will teach them the types of cases in which an interlocutory
appeal will most often result in savings to litigants and courts. Use of the
statute can, if necessary, then be expanded through the judges' own
initiative. On the other hand, were the courts to use the statute liberally
at its inception, they would likely find that certain types of appeals delay
rather than materially advance litigation. If the courts should then attempt
to contract the application of the procedure, it would seem that considerable
delays would be occasioned by the necessity for deciding numerous petitions from litigants accustomed to the more liberal approach. Thus, the
courts' restricted use of the statute seems proper.
33. See also Berger v. United States, 27 U.S.L. Wx 2443 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
Certification for appeal was denied because of the lack of "substantial ground for
difference of opinion on the question of law." The trial court, after reviewing the
conflict among the courts in the area of law involved, concluded that there was "no
such probability of success for defendant upon review of the instant decision as to
justify expediting its appeal."
34. But see Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc., 27 U.S.L. WE= 2460 (3d Cir. 1959).
35. H.R. REP. No. 1667, 85 Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 2 (1958). The legislative history

of the act is outlined in the Milbert case.

36. S. REP. No. 2434, 85 Cong., Zd Sess. 4 (1958).
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INCOME

TAX-COMMSSIoNER 's REGuLAT Io N DrFImNG USFUL
LiFE FOR PURPOSES OF DEPECITION AS USEFUL LIFE IN THE
TAXPAYER'S BUsmsS UPHELD

Plaintiff's predecessor, engaged in renting and leasing automobiles and
trucks, was merged into plaintiff. For the three taxable years ending
March 31, 1956, the predecessor had depreciated its automobiles on the
basis of a four-year life, using rates of thirty per cent for each of the
first two years and twenty per cent for each of the last two years. Entitled
to file claims for refunds of its predecessor's income tax, plaintiff sought
to recompute the predecessor's depreciation using the declining balance
method 1 which would result in a tax saving of over $14,000. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 limits the use of the declining balance
method to assets with a "useful life" of three years or more.2 Since the
automobiles were held for less than three years, plaintiff argued that useful
life means the economic life of the asset. The court rejected this argument,
holding that "useful life" means life in the taxpayer's business.3 With
regard to using the declining balance method for depreciation of trucks
which were held for more than three years, the government contended that
salvage value should be considered when the declining balance method is
used. The court held that salvage value other than that which is inherent
in the method itself is not a factor in determining depreciation under the
declining balance method. Hertz Corp.. v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 261
(D. Del. 1958).
1. See note 6 infra.
2. INTERiAL REVENUE CODE Of 1954:

"§ 167. Depreciation
"(a) General Rule.-There shall be allowed as a depreciation deduction a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear (including a reasonable allowance
for obsolescence)(1) of property use in the trade or business, or
(2) of property held for the production of income.
"(b) Use of Certain Methods and Rates.-For taxable years ending after December 31, 1953, the term 'reasonable allowance' as used in subsection (a) shall include
(but shall not be limited to) an allowance computed in accordance with regulations
prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate, under any of the following methods:
(1) the straight line method,
(2) the declining balance method, using a rate not exceeding twice the rate
which would have been used had the annual allowance been computed under the
method described in paragraph (1).
(3) the sum of the years-digits method, and
(4) any other consistent method ....
"(c) Limitatiois on Use of Certain Methods and Rates.-Paragraphs (2), (3),
and (4) of subsection (b) shall apply only in the case of property (other than intangible property) described in subsection (a) with a useful life of 3 years or
more ....

3. Nonetheless, the court held that plaintiff was entitled to the tax rebate. Since
the Commissioner's interpretation of "useful life" as meaning "useful life in the
business" was first promulgated in 1956, "common justice requires that it be given
a prospective construction only." Instant case at 275. See text accompanying note 8

infra.
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The declining balance method of depreciation, now available to all
taxpayers 4 who have property used in trade or business or held for the
production of income,5 allows the taxpayer to depreciate at a rate not
6
This
exceeding twice the rate allowable under the straight line system.
years
or
of
three
life"
has
a
"useful
that
method is limited to property
7
many
years
interpreted
for
life"
bad
been
The phrase "useful
more.
by the courts as meaning the economic life of the asset regardless of how
long each individual taxpayer made use of it.8 Taxpayers, in estimating
the period over which the asset is to be depreciated, need not adhere
10
solely to physical life 9 but may take normal obsolescence into account.
As to automobiles, the courts have accepted taxpayers' estimates of economic life of three," four, 1 2 and five years,' s depending on the circumstances of the individual taxpayer. The period may be changed at the
end of any taxable year if "there is a clear and convincing basis for the
redetermination." 14 In 1956, the Commissioner redefined "useful life"
as being "the period over which the asset may reasonably be expected to be
useful to the taxpayer in his trade or business or in the production of his
income." 15 In the only other cases on this issue, both arising under the
16
Sal1939 Code, the Fifth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit are in conflict.
vage value 17 traditionally has not been taken into account, as such, under
4. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 167(b) (2). Prior to the 1954 Code, the Treasury
Department was not inclined to permit many taxpayers to use the method. Now,
no permission is required. Ponder, Internal Revenue: Depreciation Under the New
Code, 41 A.B.A.j. 726 (1955).
5. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 167(a), supra note 2.
6. INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 167(b) (2), supra note 2. Thus, a ten-year asset
(10% a year under the straight line method) could be depreciated at a rate of 20%
the first year and then 20% of the remaining balance in each of the subsequent years.
The 1939 Code permitted a maximum of one and one-half times the straight line rate.
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 2, § 23(1), 53 Stat. 12, as amended.
7. INT. Rxv. CoDE oF 1954, § 167(c), supra note 2.
8. Philber Equip. Corp. v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1956); Massey
Motors, Inc. v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 516 (S.D. Fla. 1957) ; Merkle Broom Co.,
3 B.T.A. 1084 (1926).
9. American Refrigerator Transit Co., 31 B.T.A. 465 (1934).
10. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a) -9 (1956). Normal obsolescence is described generally
as "technological improvements and reasonably forsecable economic changes." In
the case of abnormal obsolescence useful life may be subsequently recomputed. Ibid.
11. Fort Worth Warehouse & Storage Co., 6 B.T.A. 536 (1927) (cars used
over rough roads to and from oil fields).
12. Merkle Broom Co., 3 B.T.A. 1084 (1926) (car used for delivery purposes).
13. Peter Seletos, 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1468 (1956) (car used half for pleasure
and half for business).
14. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-1 (b) (1956).
15. Ibid.
16. Compare Evans v. Commissioner, CCH 1959 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (59-1
U.S. Tax Cas.) 9208 (9th Cir. Jan. 26, 1959), reversing 16 CCH Tax Ct Mem. 639
(1957), with U.S. v. Massey Motors, Inc., CCH 1959 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (59-1
U.S. Tax Cas.) f 9281 (5th Cir. Feb. 26, 1959).
17. Salvage value traditionally has been considered as the estimated value of the
asset at the end of its useful life. For example, salvage value is described by the
Internal Revenue Service as "the amount [determined at the time of acquisition]
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the declining balance method Is since at the end of the period of depreciation there inherently remains some balance supposedly representing salvage value. 19 However, an asset may not be depreciated below a reasonable salvage value in any event.20 In order to eliminate a remaining
balance that is greater than a reasonable salvage value a taxpayer using
the declining balance method may change at any time to the straight line
21
method without the consent of the Commissioner.
The congressional purpose 22 in limiting the declining balance method
to assets having a useful life of three years or more and the purpose of
the Commissioner's recent redefinition of useful life are the same. These
limitations prevent owners of short-lived assets from depreciating all, or
substantially all, of the value of an asset, while a major portion of the
asset's value in fact remains. This depreciation would be a deduction
from income which would have been taxable at a rate of fifty-two per cent,
for example, for certain corporations. Sale of the asset would then create
a book profit equal to the excess depreciation taken, but taxable as a
capital gain at only twenty-five per cent.2 3 Thus, if use of the declining
balance method were permitted, two-year assets could be fully depreciated
the first year and, any amount realized on the sale of the asset after this
point would be a long-term capital gain. 2 4

Congress precluded this result.

Plaintiff, in "an example taken at random," 25 realized a long-term capital
gain of $661.33 on an automobile which it depreciated over a period of
four years 26 but sold after fourteen months of use. The Commissioner's
redefinition and the instant holding preclude this result.
The principal burden of plaintiff's argument was that an examination
of the intent of Congress would reveal that "useful life . . . has consiswhich is estimated will be realizable upon sale or other disposition of an asset when
it is no longer useful in the taxpayer's trade or business or in the production of his
income and is to be retired from service by the taxpayer." Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-1 (c)
(1956).
18. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b)-2(a) (1956).
19. For example, a $1,000 asset with a useful life of four years would depreciate
$500 the first year (or 50%, twice the 25% allowable under straight line method),
$250 the second year, $125 the third year, and $62.50 the fourth year leaving a
"salvage value" of $62.50. See note 6 supra and accompanying text
20. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b)-2(a) (1956).
21. Treas. Reg. §1.167(e)-1(b) (1956).
22. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1954).
23. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1231 permits special capital gains treatment for
property used in the trade or business which is subject to depreciation.
24. Almost as unrealistic a result occurs for a three-year asset which is depreciated 66%,g the first year. In order to avoid such situations, use of formulae
based on accounting concepts of the declining balance have been suggested. See
Lassers, Depreciatimo Under the 1954 Code, 32 TAxES 695 (1954). However, once
beyond the three-year asset, situations of unrealistic write-offs quickly disappear.
25. Instant case at 269 n.6. This example was taken from Brief for Defendant,
p. 12.
26. See text accompanying note 8 mira.
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tently meant and still means the life of an asset for general business
purposes, by whomever used, and not a shorter period during which a
taxpayer may happen to hold such asset." 27 In light of the fact that
judicial interpretation, administrative practice, and the long-continued adverse position of' the Commissioner were available to and understood by
Congress when it re-inserted the phrase "useful life" in the 1954 Code,
the validity of the court's rejection of this contention is open to considerable question. 28 Further, since the only remaining method of depreciation
available is straight line, 2 9 the effect of the instant decision is to deny the
benefits of a realistic depreciation deduction to taxpayers who hold assets
30
for less than three years regardless of the economic life of the asset.
Accelerated depreciation allows for a more uniform operating cost over the
life of the asset since maintenance costs and partial replacements will increase as the asset ages.3 ' In addition, accelerated depreciation deductions
more nearly reflect the sharp declines in resale value which occur in the
early years of use,3 2 and allow the greatest percentage of depreciation to
be charged off in the earlier years when productivity is greatest.3 3 Thus,
the congressional purpose of permitting rapid recovery of cost so that
more capital will be available to finance business expansion 34 will be undermined to some extent and the Treasury Department's concern with its
immediate revenue gain may well be short-sighted. 35 Finally, although

the instant decision closes the capital gain "loophole" for taxpayers who
hold the assets for less than three years, it does nothing about the "loophole" in reference to taxpayers who hold the assets for three years or
more.36

This arbitrariness might well cause taxpayers close to the cut-off

27. Brief for Plaintiff, p. 20. Additional litigation on this issue appears to be a
certainty since plaintiff announced to its stockholders in its report of September 30,
1958 that it considers the decision in the instant case to be in error and will continue
to use accelerated depreciation. 10 J. TAXATION 27 (1959).
28. For further discussion of this issue see Evans v. Commissioner, supra note 16;
27 Gsx,. WASH. L. REV. 265 (1958); H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 24
(1954); S.RFa. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 25-26 (1954).
29. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 167(c), quoted mpra note 2.
30. Ibid. "This [straight line] system, which spreads the cost evenly over the
asset's life, is simple, but the deductions which it allows are frequently at odds with
the actual facts." Remarks by Marion B. Folsom, Under Secretary of the Treasury,
Washington Seminar on Marketing, Sept. 30, 1954, in Brown, The New Depreciation
Policy Under the Income Tax: An Economic Analysis, 8 NAT'L TAX J. 81, 82 n.5
(1955).
31. Edmonds, The effect on Business Decisionr of Changes in Tax Depredation
Policy, 8 NAT'L TAx J.99, 103 (1955).
32. Ibid.
33. Graves, Depreciation for Tax Purposes, 34 TAxEs 59, 60 (1956).
34. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1954).
35. Prior Internal Revenue depreciation restrictions resulted in short term revenue spurts but it is likely that more was lost in the long run due to the frightening
of capital from the new plant and equipment market. Graichen, Today's Depreciation
Deductim, 104 J.AcCOUNTANCY 27 (1957).
36. Thus, a taxpayer who holds for an average period of thirty-five months is
discriminated against while a taxpayer who holds for an average of two months
longer gains the "loophole" benefits.
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date to delay disposing of assets and to operate contrary to sound economic
considerations.
Prior Revenue Department attempts to prevent use of the accelerated
depreciation deduction and the capital gain provision to avoid taxes have
also proved unsatisfactory. One such attempt, particularly adapted to
automobile renting businesses and other businesses with a rapid turnover
of assets, was to label the assets as being held primarily for sale in the
ordinary course of the taxpayer's business rather than as capital assets.37
This attempt was rejected by the courts.3 8 By precluding any depreciation
it would have denied taxpayers the right to charge off the expenses of an
asset against that income which the asset produces.8 9 Another proposed
regulation would have required taxpayers to use the longest experienced
useful life of the asset as a period of depreciation, rather than a more
realistic average useful life. 40 This attempt was rejected as incompatible
with the principle of allowing reasonable depreciation deductions. 41 Revenue agents have also readjusted salvage value at the time the asset was
sold, thus reducing the current depreciation deduction in order to reduce
or eliminate the capital gain that would otherwise result.4 2 This practice
is, however, contrary to the congressional intention that rises in resale
value due to price rises should be taxed at capital gains rates, 43 and is also
contrary to a regulation of the Commissioner to this effect. 44 On the
other hand, revenue agents legitimately 45 attempt to eliminate unwarranted
capital gains by stopping depreciation when a reasonable salvage value
has been reached. 4 6 But this is of no avail where assets are sold before
a reasonable salvage value has been reached but after unduly heavy depreciation has been taken.4 7 The Treasury Department has also made
37. Note, Useful Life and Salvage Value: Changing Concepts, 7 DRAKE L.

REv.

32, 37 (1957).
38. Philber Equip. Corp. v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1956) ; Massey
Motors, Inc. v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 516 (S.D. Fla. 1957). But see Charlie
Hilliard, CCH TAx CT. REP., Dec. 23,444 (Feb. 9, 1959).
39. This method would place a particular burden on new businesses which would
be unable to take any depreciation on their "fixed assets" of this type in the early years

of business.
40. 36 TAXEs 65 (1958).
41. Ibid.
42. Romal, How Agents Are Applying the New Salvage and Accelerated Depreciation Rules, 8 J. TAXATiON 204 (1958). See also Cohn v. United States, 259
F2d 371 (6th Cir. 1958), for recent approval of practices of this sort.
43. See note 23 supra and text accompanying note 53 infra.

44. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-1(c) (1956).
45. See text accompanying note 20 supra.

46. 36 TAxEs 65 (1958).

But see Note, 7

DRAKE

L. REv. 32, 42 (1957) (salvage

value has previously been ignored by taxpayers and revenue agents and assets have

been fully depreciated).
47. See text accompanying note 52 infra.
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at least two direct attempts to have Congress alter the law by recommending that gains on assets subject to accelerated depreciation be treated as
ordinary income or, if the gains be treated as capital gains, that the losses
should be treated as capital losses. 48 Both attempts failed 40 since the
recommendations ran contrary to the philosophy of Congress of promoting
capital investment by encouraging the replacement of assets."0 Further,
since deduction of a capital loss is restricted to capital gains realized in
the taxable year or within the carryover period, 51 the latter recommendation would create the danger that taxpayers might lose these deductions
in periods of declining prices.
It appears clear that Congress did not intend accelerated depreciation
to be used as a tax avoidance scheme by some taxpayers. 52 It appears
equally clear that Congress did intend to provide taxpayers with "a more
rapid recovery of the greater portion of cost" 53 and that Congress intended
the capital gains provisions to encourage the purchase of new assets by
compensating for price level increases. 54 Either of two solutions would
seem to achieve the total of these congressional intentions. One is to
insist that declining balance method taxpayers more realistically estimate
economic life. The unrealistic5 5 estimates presently used, based either
on the Treasury Department's Bulletin F,56 which has been generally
discredited, 57 or on the business life 5 of the asset, cause unduly quick
depreciation and permit the resultant capital gain. By insisting on depreciation over the normal economic life the Revenue Service, under existing law, can eliminate predetermined capital gains and still allow taxpayers the benefits of declining balance depreciation. An alternative solu48. Although INT?. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 1231 permits capital gains treatment for
these assets it provides that "if such gains do not exceed such losses, such gains
and losses shall not be considered as gains and losses from sales or exchanges of
capital assets."
49. See INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 1231.
50. Brief for Plaintiff, p. 51.
51. IN . REv. CoDE oF 1954, §§ 1211, 1212.
52. S. R .No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1954).
53. Brief for Defendant, p. 12.
54. See text accompanying notes 34, 43, 50 supra.
55. Common experience reveals that an automobile has some economic use beyond
the four years over which plaintiff's predecessor depreciated it, that after four years
a $2,000 automobile would bring more than $125 (the inherent salvage value remaining
under the declining balance method), and that this excess is not solely due to a price
level rise.
56. 2 CCH 1959 STAi. FED. TAx REP. 111 1776, 1777. Revised in 1942, Bulletin
F gives estimated useful lives and depreciation rates for various depreciable assets.
57. Industrial representatives conceded this before a congressional hearing. Brief
for Defendant, p. 16. For further criticism see Graves, Depreciation Problems, 102
J.ACCOUNrA'icy 43 (1956).
58. "Over the years, useful life has been considered to be the business life of an
asset . . . [i.e.] the total life for which the asset was useful for business purposes."
Brief for Plaintiff, p. 15.
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tion is to require salvage value 59 to be estimated for the declining balance
method just as under any of the other methods of depreciation. It would
appear that this requires congressional action. 60 It too would give the
taxpayer the benefit of accelerated depreciation yet tend to eliminate the
unwarranted capital gains that occur due to the unrealistically low salvage
62
61
in the declining balance method.
value that is inherent

INCOME

TAX-TRAVELING EXPENSE DEDUCTION DISALLOWED FOR

WORKER S EmPLOYED AWAY FRom T:Eirn
PERMAXENT RESIDENCES FOR PERIODS OF FRom EIGHT TO TWENTY
CONSTRUCTION

MONTHS
Petitioners, three construction workers, were employed at Kinston,
North Carolina for continuous periods of over twenty, twelve and eight
months respectively. All three maintained a permanent residence elsewhere in North Carolina at distances ranging from eighty-six to 122 miles
from the construction site. Obtaining employment through a referral
59. See note 17 supra.
60. See discussion and authority cited in instant case at 274-75. See also text
accompanying notes 18-19 supra. But see Evans v. Commissioner, CCH 1959 STAm.
Fr. TAX REP. (59-1 U.S. Tax Cas.) 19208 (9th Cir., Jan 26, 1959), reversing 16
CCH Tax Ct. Merm. 639 (1957).
61. See note 19 mipra.
62. The application of this proposal would require the use of a formula which
would result in some modification of the present declining balance method. Professor
(C-S) (l-r)
Oscar S. Nelson has proposed a geometric progression formula: D=
X-r

n

A Diminishing Depreciation Method Based on Geometric Progression, 90 J. AccouNTAccy 57 (1950).
To illustrate, assume an asset with a four-year economic
life but which the taxpayer estimates from his experience will be disposed of within
two years. Applying the formula to a cost (C) of $2,000, a salvage value at the
end of the two years (S) of $800, a rate (r) of 50% which is twice the straight
line rate, and (n) equalling the number of years that it is estimated that the
asset is to be actually depreciated, the first year's depreciation (D.) is $800. The
subsequent year's depreciation is calculated by multiplying (r) times the prior year's
depreciation. It should be noted that this differs from the present system in that
this formula does not allow for double the amount of straight line depredation to be
taken in the first year. See note 19 supra. However, it does emulate the present
system by providing for a uniformly declining amount of depreciation each year. It
is submitted that this was Congress' principal purpose in establishing the declining
balance method and that the "twice the straight line" provision is simply a limitation
that can be improved upon. One objection to use of the above formula is that, in the
example, if the asset were kept beyond the estimated holding period it could never
be depreciated below a value of $400. This defect is ameliorated by permitting the
taxpayer to switch to straight line. See text accompanying note 21 supra. Other
formulae have been promulgated: Benjamin, A Diminishing Depreciation Based on
a Sinw Curve Works With Any Scrap Value, 89 J. ACcoUNTANCY 303 (1950);
Letter From Harold Bierman, Jr., to the Editor, 92 J. ACCOUNTANCY 21 (1951).
It is submitted that no formula for general application offers a panacea. However,
it does appear that one of the above formulae, or modifications thereof, would be an
improvement of the present method despite their relative complexity.
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by their local union,1 petitioners had worked at a series of jobs throughout
several southeastern states both before and after their employment at
Kinston. In reporting adjusted gross income for 1953 each petitioner
deducted amounts expended for board and lodging at Kinston during the
period of employment there and for transportation from Kinston to their
permanent residence upon leaving that employment. The Tax Court reversed the Commissioner's disallowance of these deductions, holding that
"the employment is properly to be considered as temporary in nature." 2
The court of appeals reversed.3 While recognizing that work in the heavy
construction industry has a degree of impermanence, that court held the
Tax Court's conclusion "clearly erroneous" because the petitioners had
failed to sustain the burden of proving that their employment was not of
indefinite duration. The Supreme Court affirmed, per curiam, holding
that it was a narrow question of fact as to whether petitioner's employment
was "temporary" or "indefinite," and that on this question the court of
appeals had "made a fair assessment of the record." Peurifoy v. Commissioner, 358 U.S. 59 (1958).
The Internal Revenue Code provides that "traveling expenses .
while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business" are deductible from gross income.4 This language has been presented to the
Supreme Court for interpretation only once prior to the instant case. In
Flowers v. Commissioner,5 the Court denied a traveling expense deduction to a lawyer employed by a railroad who chose to maintain his home
in Jackson, Mississippi, although his permanent place of business was in
Mobile, Alabama. The Internal Revenue Service, 6 Tax Court 7 and
Fourth Circuit 8 had previously held that a taxpayer's "home" was his
principal place of business, regardless of where taxpayer's family resi1. A referral is not tantamount to employment. The individual worker must
apply to the contractor at the job site for employment It is the custom of local
unions to refer their members to other jurisdictions when- the other jurisdiction is
short of skilled workers. Commissioner v. Peurifoy, 254 F.2d 483, 485, 486 (4th
Cir. 1957).
2. James E. Peurifoy, 27 T.C. 149, 157 (1956).
3. Commissioner v. Peurifoy, 254 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1957).
4. Int Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 289, §§22(n)(2), 23(a)(1)(A), 52 Stat 460
(now Ivre. REV. CODE OF 1954, f§ 62, 162). The applicable sections read: "Sec. 22(n)
Definition of 'Adjusted Gross Income' . . . means the gross income minus . . .
(2) Expenses of Travel and Lodging in Connection With Employment-The deductions allowed by § 23 which consist of expenses of travel, means, and lodging while
away from home. . . . Sec. 23 Deductions from Gross Income. (a) Expenses
(1) Trade or Business Expenses-(A) In General- . . . traveling expenses (including the entire amount expended for meals and lodging) while away from home
in the pursuit of a trade or business. . . ." The Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
§§ 62, 162, left these portions of the 1939 Code unchanged.
5. 326 U.S. 465 (1946).
6. Rev. Rul. 5649, 1956 INT. REV. BULL. No. 8, at 6; Int Rev. Serv. Pub.
No. 300, at 2 (1956). See also Rev. Rul. 54-497, 1954-2 Cum. BuLu. 75.
7. Luke E. O'Toole, 15 CCH Tax Ct Mem. 667 (1956), aff'd per curiamn, 243
F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1957); Allan Cunningham, 22 T.C. 906 (1954); Mort L. Bixler,
5 B.T.A. 1181 (1927) ; see 4 MnrTEs, FEDE L INcOwE TAxATIoN § 25.93 (1954);
cf. Peter F. Janss, 16 CCH Tax Ct Mem. 365 (1957).
8. Barnhill v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1945).
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dence was located. To the contrary, the Fifth 9 and Ninth 10 Circuits
had held that "home" means place of residence or abode. In Flowers the
Court established three conditions to be satisfied before a traveling expense
deduction will be allowed.
"(1) The expense must be a reasonable and necessary traveling
expense. . .
(2) The expense must be incurred 'while away from
home.' (3) The expense must be incurred in pursuit of business.
. . .[T]here must be a direct connection between the expenditure
and the carrying on of the trade or business of the taxpayer or his
employer." 11

Since the Court found that the expenses were incurred solely by the
desire of the taxpayer to maintain a home in Jackson and thus did not fulfill the third requirement, it declined to resolve the conflict over the
definition of "home." 12 The prevailing view today as to the meaning of
home is that of the Internal Revenue Service. 13 This definition has caused
trouble in those cases where a taxpayer works away from what has been
his principal place of employment for a period of time, or where a taxpayer, by the nature of his employment, has no principal place of employment. To meet these situations, the Tax Court has used the duration of
employment as a test to determine the deductibility of traveling expenses.
14
Thus, if a taxpayer works away from his principal place of employment
or his place of abode 1 5 for a "temporary," as opposed to "indefinite,"
period he will be allowed a deduction for traveling expenses. The distinction between temporary and indefinite employment has not proved
entirely satisfactory 16 and has led to an inconsistency in Tax Court de9. Flowers v. Commissioner, 148 F2d 163 (5th Cir. 1945), rev'd on other groutds,
326 U.S. 465 (1946).
10. Wallace v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1944).
11. 326 U.S. at 470. An examination of Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ci. 289,
§23(a) (1) (A), 52 Stat. 460, will show that the last two requirements merely
restate the statute.
12. However, one leading authority has stated in referring to the Supreme
Court's opinion in Commissioter v. Flowers, "[The] Supreme Court has apparently
foreclosed the deduction by a taxpayer whose 'home' is not at his principal place
of business." 1 RAPKIN & JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOmE GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION
§ 3.06(2) (1954).
13. Peurifoy v. Commissioner, 254 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1957); O'Toole v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1957); Ford v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 297 (4th
Cir. 1955). Only one case has held the "ordinary meaning" view of "home" as
controlling law, and neither the Tax Court nor any appellate court since has shared
this view. Summerour v. Allen, 99 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ga. 1951).
14. See 4 MERTENS, op. cit. stpra note 7; RAPKIN & JOHNSON, op. cit. stpra
note 12, § 3.06(3) (4) ; 2 TAx COUNSELOR'S Q. 15, 24 (1958) ; Brief for Respondent,
p. 23.
15. Ibid. See also McDonald, Travel and Entertainment Expenses, in N.Y.U.
11TH INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 1173, 1179 (1953); 2 TAx CouNsELOR's Q.
15, 24 (1958); 43 VA. L. REv. 59 (1957).
16. 4 MERTENS, op. cit. supra note 7, § 25.93, at 203; 1 RAPKIN & JOHNSON,
op. cit. supra note 12, § 3.06(3); 2 TAx COUNSELOR'S Q. 15, 24 (1958); Brief for
Respondent, p. 23.
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cisions that appears impossible to reconcile. 17 For example, a plumber
who spent thirty-three weeks away from his abode at the request of his
18
union was permitted to deduct his traveling expenses for the period,
while a deduction was denied to a similar plumber for a six week job.1 9
One construction worker was allowed a deduction for expenses occurring
during "a year or 14 month" 20 job, while another was denied deductions
for meals and lodging for a year even though he had no intention of remaining permanently and could not obtain living quarters there for his
family. 2 1 Logic would seem to require that such employment be categorized
as temporary because of the impossibility of establishing a permanent residence at the construction site and because of the certainty that the taxpayer
will return to his permanent place of abode. Despite these seeming inconsistencies, it is the view of the Internal Revenue Service that with regard
to construction jobs "employment of anticipated or actual duration of a
year or more at a particular location would strongly tend to indicate
indefinite employment there. ... ,,22
The instant case leaves the status of past interpretations of the word
home in the Code substantially unchanged. 23 What does emerge, however,
from the litigation taken as a whole is a list of factors which the courts
must weigh to determine whether a given employment is temporary or
indefinite. In denying petitioners' deductions, the court of appeals inferred that future construction workers claiming similar deductions could
best carry the burden of proving their employment temporary by introducing
evidence relating to such things as: the known or contemplated duration
of the employment at its inception; the nature of taxpayer's job; the length
of employment by similar workers on the same job; the reason taxpayer
left his employment; and the length of time taxpayer actually worked at
the job in question. 24 The major shortcoming of the use of these factors
as a means of determining the validity of deductions is the lack of certainty to the taxpayer. Allowing a deduction in all cases if the contemplated length of employment is less than a stated period of time would
permit a worker more accurately to weigh prospectively the advantages
of taking a given job. Nevertheless, since they lead a court to a fuller
inquiry into the nature of the questioned deduction, future use of these
factors by the courts should help to get sounder results from the tempo17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Ibid. See also McDonald, supra note 15, at 1179; 43 VA. L. Rv. 59 (1957).
Harry F. Schurer, 3 T.C. 544 (1944).
Ven W. Pratt, 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 335 (1952).
Michael Kuris, 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 854 (1956).
Willard S. Jones, 13 T.C. 880 (1949); see James R. Whitaker, 24 T.C. 750
(1955); Henry E. Warren, 13 T.C. 205 (1949).
See also RAPKIN & JOuNsON,
op. cit. supra note 12, § 3.06(3); 2 TAx CouNsF.LOR's Q. 15, 25 (1958).
22. 5 J. TAXATION 19 (1957).
23. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
24. Commissioner v. Peurifoy, 254 F.2d 483, 487 (4th Cir. 1957).
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rary indefinite rule. Indeed, although not emphasized by that court, these
factors may tend to explain the aforementioned apparently inconsistent
Tax Court decisions, 25 decisions which are irreconcilable if only the actual
length of the petitioners' employment is considered. Lastly, in light of
these factors it would seem that the circuit court was correct in holding
that petitioners had not met their burden of proof under the temporary/indefinite rule. The sole testimony offered as to the duration
of the work available failed to state how long petitioners contemplated that
the Kinston job would last. Moreover, there was evidence that two of
the petitioners left the job for personal reasons at a time when apparently
there was a lengthy period of construction work remaining at Kinston.
However correct and useful the instant litigation may be within the
context of the existing temporary/indefinite dichotomy, it is unfortunate
that the procedural setting of the case 26 precluded the Supreme Court
from ruling on the definition of home. As was suggested by three dissenters
in the instant case, it would seem that the proper definition of home is
not the place of taxpayer's business, but the place of his abode. 27 True,
the legislative history is far from clear concerning which particular classes
of workers, other than traveling salesmen, were meant to be benefited. 28
It appears, however, that Congress did mean to give a tax benefit to those
whose jobs required them to incur extra expenses because of the practical necessity of living away from their dwelling. For example, there
was some discussion on the floor of the Senate to the effect that when
applied to a Senator, home did not mean Washington, but the residence
from which he was elected.2 9 Defining home as the place of business
works a real hardship on workers such as the instant petitioners. Such
a definition in effect is a policy ruling that insofar as the tax laws are
concerned these persons should uproot their families repeatedly, with all
that that entails with regard to leaving schools, dwellings and friends.
It would not appear that this was the congressional intent. Nor would
equating home with residence necessarily permit the abuses that the other
definition was created to preclude. The Flowers case held that traveling expenses are not deductible if incurred for personal convenience.
Therefore, any attempt to claim deductions where the nature of taxpayer's
occupation did not necessitate changing jobs repeatedly, or to claim deductions for expenses incurred because residence and business voluntarily were
kept at great distances could be disallowed.30
25. See text accompanying note 17

vtupra.

26. The instant court stated that as neither party questioned the validity of the
temporary/indefinite dichotomy, it could not answer the question of the proper
definition of the word "home." Instant case at 60-61.
27. Instant case at 62.
28. SEIDmA"-, LEGIsLATIVE HisTORY oF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAws 1938-1861,
at 822-23 (1938); 21 Mo. L. Ry. 180, 182 (1956); 43 VA. L. Ray. 59, 60 (1957).
29. Ibid.
30. The instant case is commented upon in 44 CORNELL L.Q. 270 (1959).
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LABOR LAW-PRE S
cE OF UNFAIR LABOR PRA TIoE HELD NOT
To DIVEST FEDERAL COURT OF JURISDICTION To GRANT SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE OF AGREEMENT To ARBITRATE
Following an economic strike by plaintiff union, defendant employer
refused to reinstate fifteen employees on the ground that they had engaged
in "strike misconduct." The union demanded arbitration pursuant to
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement establishing a grievance
procedure which included arbitration and providing that a discharge might
constitute a grievance. Upon employer's refusal to arbitrate, union brought
suit in a federal district court claiming jurisdiction under section 301(a)
of the Taft-Hartley Act 1 and seeking specific performance of the arbitration agreement. The court of appeals reversed a summary judgment for
employer, holding that the fact that the refusal of reinstatement might be
an unfair labor practice 2 did not divest the district court of jurisdiction to
grant specific performance of the arbitration agreement. Lodge 12, District
37, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 257 F.2d 467
(5th Cir.), cert. denied 358 U.S. 880 (1958).
Section 301 (a) of the Taft-Hartley Act provides that:
"Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce . . . or between any such labor organizations, may be brought

in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard
to the citizenship of the parties." 3
Prior to 1957 a conflict of opinion existed as to whether this section was
merely a grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts or also provided authority
to fashion a federal substantive law for suits under collective bargaining
contracts in industries affecting commerce.4 The decision of the Supreme
Court in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills; resolved that conflict
in favor of the latter interpretation. In that case the Court held that section 301 enabled the federal district courts to grant specific performance
of arbitration clauses in collective bargaining agreements.8 Unlike Lincoln
1. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 156 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1952).
2. See note 7 infra.
3. 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1952).
4. Compare Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United Elec. Workers, 235 F.2d 298
(2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957), and Wilson & Co. v. United Pack-

inghouse Workers, 83 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (both holding federal substantive law applicable), wilth the following cases holding that § 301 was a mere grant
of jurisdiction and that no constitutional issue was presented. International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. W. L. Mead, Inc., 230 F.2d 576 (1st Cir. 1956), and Textile Workers
Union v. American Thread Co., 113 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1953).

5. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).

6. For an indication of the varied reception with which Lincoln Mills was met,
see Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln
Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1957); Note, 57 COLUm. L. REv. 1123 (1957);
Note, 36 N.C.L. Rv., 215 (1958); Comment, 30 Rocxy MT. L. Rav. 62 (1957).
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Mills, the dispute for which arbitration was sought in the instant case
7
involved conduct which may have been an unfair labor practice. The
federal courts which have been presented with the question of whether
that factor is sufficient to preclude the taking of jurisdiction under section
301 are not in agreement. 8 Nor has the Supreme Court yet considered the
effect of the presence of an unfair labor practice on the jurisdiction of
arbitrators.
The doctrine that exclusive NLRB jurisdiction over unfair labor
practices "pre-empts" other tribunals from hearing disputes in which such
conduct is present stems from the decision of the Supreme Court in
Garner v. Teamsters Union.9 In that case the Court held that state courts
lack jurisdiction to enjoin activity which may constitute an unfair labor
practice, even though such activity is also a violation of state law. The
reasoning of the Court appears to mingle fear of potentially inconsistent
regulation of labor relations by two separate authorities with a view that
federal regulation under Taft-Hartley is pervasive, leaving neither room
nor need for state action. 10 The fact that the particular case falls within
the area in which the NLRB declines to take jurisdiction does not permit
the states to act." Later decisions, however, appear to have modified the
broad doctrine laid down in Garner. In United Constr. Workers v.
Laburnum Corp.12 the Court affirmed judgment for plaintiff employer who
sued defendant union in a state court, seeking damages in tort rather than
7. Section 8(a) (1) of Taft-Hartley makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 7." 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1952).
Section 7, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1952), gives employees the right
of self-organization and in the instant case the discharge for "strike misconduct"
could be construed as an interference with -this right. The conduct in question
could also be an unfair labor practice under § 8(a) (3), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1952), which proscribes discriminatory conduct
aimed at discouraging membership in a labor organization.
8. United Elec. Workers v. Worthington Corp., 236 F.2d 364 (1st Cir. 1956)
(arbitration award may be enforced even though it concerns a reinstatement and
back pay award for a discharge that may have been an unfair labor practice). Contra,
United Elec. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 231 F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir. 1956), affirning in
part, 127 F. Supp. 934 (D.D.C. 1954), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956).
9. 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
10. The Garner court thought that Congress sought through "centralized administration of specially designed procedures" to "obtain uniform application of its
substantive rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to result from a
variety of local procedures and attitudes toward labor controversies. . . . A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures are quite as apt to produce incompatible or conflicting adjudication as are different rules of substantive law." Id.
at 490-91.
11. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957). It has been held,
however, that state courts may take jurisdiction over picketing violence in the exercise of the police power over traditionally local matters. United Auto. Workers
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956). Likewise, they may
enjoin unions from recurrent and unannounced work stoppages, United Auto.
Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949), and from
enforcement of maintenance-of-membership clauses, since such union activity is
neither prohibited nor protected by the federal act, Algoma Plywood and Veneer Co. v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 301 (1949).
12 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
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injunctive relief. In so doing, the Court stressed the fragmentary character of Taft-Hartley, observing that "Congress has neither provided nor
suggested any substitute for the traditional state court procedure for collecting damages for injuries caused by tortious conduct," 13 and therefore,
to preclude recovery in such cases would be to "deprive [injured parties of
their] property without recourse or compensation." 14 The possibility that
the state action might impair the functioning of the federal scheme appeared to have been accorded little weight. Similarly, in International
Ass'n of Machinistsv. Gonzales' 5 and United Auto. Workers v. Russell,'"
the Court affirmed state judgments awarded in contract and tort actions
against the unions, even though the awards included amounts for mental
suffering in one case ' 7 and punitive damages in the other,' 8 and even
though partial relief could have been granted by the NLRB.' 9 Whether
these decisions indicate that the Court is moving toward a limitation of the
pre-emption doctrine to cases in which it feels that federal regulation and
federal relief are adequate, or whether instead it will continue to confine
jurisdiction to the NLRB whenever the possibility of inconsistent adjudication is sufficiently great, must await future clarification.
Solution of the problem of whether in the instant situation the possible
presence of an unfair labor practice precludes the federal courts from
enforcing the arbitration agreement requires more than a mere mechanistic
application of the "pre-emption" doctrine represented by the Garner holding. In the light of the foregoing decisions it appears proper to inquire
whether the relief available from the NLRB is sufficiently complete to
supplant arbitration as a means of solving labor disputes, and whether
compulsory resort to arbitration presents a danger of impairing federal
regulation, through the NLRB, of labor-management relations. Arbitration, as dispute-handling machinery, differs significantly from NLRB adjudication. In the instant case, for example, were the Board to take
jurisdiction it could resolve the dispute in only two basic ways. If it found
that the employer's action was based on the employees' union activities
it could order their reinstatement, with or without back pay. If instead it
found that union activity was not the basis for the refusal of reinstatement,
13. Id. at 663-64.
14. Id. at 664.
15. 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
16. 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
17. Plaintiff in Gonzales was awarded $2,500 for mental distress. 356 U.S. at
628. Plaintiff also received $6,800 in back pay. Gonzales v. International Ass'n
of Machinists, 142 Cal. App. Zd 207, 221, 298 P.2d 92, 101 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956).
18. Plaintiff in Russell recovered $500 actual and $9,500 punitive damages. 356
U. S. at 652 n.10. Compare the Laburnmo case in which plaintiff recovered $30,000
in actual and $100,000 in punitive damages. 347 U.S. at 658.
19. The Court noted in Russell, 356 U.S. at 642, that § 10(c) of Taft-Hartley,
61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1952), gives the Board authority to award
against an employer or labor organization in this situation damages limited to
reimbursement of back pay. In Gonzales, 356 U.S. at 631, the dissent pointed out
that while the NLRB could order plaintiff reinstated in his job, with back pay, it
could not order him reinstated in the union as the state court did.
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it would be forced to uphold the employer's action.20 Private arbitrators,
on the other hand, are not limited to a consideration of the employer's
motivation alone, but can weigh the conduct of the employees against the
severity of the discipline sought to be imposed by the employer, settling the
dispute, perhaps, by permitting temporary suspension but barring discharge.21 The arbitral relief may thus take a different form, better suited
to the dispute in question, from that which could be had from the Board.
Further differences may be noted. The nature of the arbitration process
and the fact that the parties themselves have agreed on both the forum and
the judge is undoubtedly more conducive to labor peace, even though in a
given case resort to that process is court-compelled, than is adjudication by
a tribunal established and imposed by governmental authority. 22 The
arbitral forum is, moreover, readily available; adjudication is not dependent
upon a decision by the General Counsel of the NLRB to take or not to take
the case.2
These differences suggest that the "inadequacy" of Board
proceedings which was apparently significant to the Laburnum, Gonzales,
and Russell decisions 24 is here present, justifying the conclusion that
arbitration is supplementary to, rather than a substitute for, unfair labor
practice proceedings. Unless a substantial danger of arbitrator-Board conflict is present, enforcement of arbitration agreements would seem consistent with the effectuation of the federal regulatory scheme imposed
through Taft-Hartley.
Such danger appears absent. Of initial importance is Congress' view
as to the desirability of arbitration. Section 203(d) of the act, dealing
with one aspect of the problem, declares that: "Final adjustment by a
method agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared to be the desirable
method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application
or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement. .

.

.'"2

Consistently, section 10(a) empowers, rather than requires, the Board to
prevent unfair labor practices. 28 The Board itself has generally followed
20. Under § 10(a) of Taft-Hartley, 61 Stat 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a)

(1952), the Board can grant relief only to remedy an unfair labor practice.

21. The arbitrator's ability to make more definitive awards and rulings is illustreated by the cases collected under § 94.559 of Labor Arbitration Reports.
22. For a discussion of the advantages of regulation imposed by the parties
themselves as contrasted with that imposed by government see Dunau, Contractual
Prohibition of Unfair Labor Practices: JurisdictionalProblems, 57 CoLum. L. REv.
52 (1957).
23. Under § 3(d) of Taft-Hartley, the General Counsel "shall have final authority, on behalf of the Board, in respect of the investigation of charges and issuance
of complaints . . . and . . . prosecution of such complaints before the Board.

." 61 Stat 139 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 153(d). The general jurisdictional policies
of the NLRB are set forth in NLRB Release No. 342, Oct. 6, 1950.
24. See text accompanying notes 12-18 supra.
25. 61 Stat 154 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1952).
26. "The Board is empowered as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person
from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section [8] . . .) affecting
commerce. This power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or
prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law or otherwise...
61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §160(a) (1952). (Emphasis added.)
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a policy of declining to take jurisdiction when arbitration has been utilized
or is available.2 7 Such a policy is undoubtedly based on the conclusion
that arbitration better effectuates the purposes of the federal act than does
NLRB coercion, or at least that normally the two processes can co-exist.
These views expressed by the two bodies responsible for establishing and
implementing national labor policies seem entitled to considerable weight.
Nevertheless, it appears appropriate to ask whether, if arbitrators are permitted to operate in the area of NLRB jurisdiction, a danger of conflict
exists. The only substantial danger would seem to lie in the possibility of
an arbitral award inconsistent with Board policy. For example, the
arbitrator may uphold discharge of an employee when under the relevant
facts the Board would find the discharge to be an unfair labor practice. If
such an arbitral decision were to stand, the employer would in a sense be
permitted to engage in conduct which the act seeks to eliminate. The
strength of this possibility is difficult to determine. To the extent that
such awards endanger the effectuation of Taft-Hartley policies, however,
they appear curable. Section 10(a) provides that NLRB power to prevent
unfair labor practices "shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention." 28 Thus even though arbitration has been completed,
the Board, upon the filing of a complaint, can take jurisdiction to correct
arbitral "mistakes." This power has, in practice, been utilized by the Board
concurrently with its general policy of declining jurisdiction when arbitration is available. 29 Admittedly final relief is somewhat delayed, but this
delay hardly outweighs the benefits obtainable through arbitration. Moreover, should the possibility of an undesirable arbitral decision appear sufficiently great, jurisdiction can be taken at the outset. 30 In view of the

presence of this reservoir of power to avoid decisions which might frustrate
the functioning of federal regulation, together with the superiority of
arbitration as a means of settling labor disputes, there seems no compelling
reason to preclude the granting by the federal courts of specific performance
of agreements to arbitrate, even though an unfair labor practice may be

present.

PENSIONS-SusPENsioiq oF RERED GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE'S
PENSION FOR REFUSAL ON GRoUND OF FIFTH AMENDMENT To TEs-

TIFY

BEFORE FEDERAL GRAND JURy HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Plaintiff, a former employee of the Internal Revenue Service, retired
voluntarily in 1951 after thirty years of service. Portions of his monthly
compensation had been withheld pursuant to the Civil Service Retirement
27. Dunau, Contractual Prohibitiom of Unfair Labor Practices: Jurisdictional
Problems, 57 CoLum. L. REv. 52, 59-64 (1957) ; Note, 69 HRxv. L. REv. 725, 726-31

(1956).

28. 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1952).
29. See Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
30. Ibid.
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Act,' and under that Act upon retirement he received an annuity. In
1954 plaintiff was subpoenaed to appear before a federal grand jury investigating the operations of the Internal Revenue Service. Acting upon
the advice of counsel, he refused to answer any questions, pleading the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Plaintiff was indicted
by the grand jury, tried for the offenses charged, and acquitted. Thereafter his annuity was suspended by the Civil Service Commission, pursuant
to Public Law 769,2 because of his refusal to testify before the grand jury.
Plaintiff brought suit in the Court of Claims, contending that Public Law
769 was unconstitutional and seeking a judgment in the amount of the
payments falling due under the annuity since its suspension. The United
States filed a counterclaim seeking the return of all annuity payments
made subsequent to plaintiff's appearance before the grand jury less a
credit in the amount of plaintiff's unreturned contributions. Public Law 769
provided for a return of amounts contributed toward the annuity to anyone
denied subsequent payments under that Act.3 The court granted plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment, holding that the statute violated due
process since it cut off payments under an annuity in which plaintiff had
a vested contractual right, and since the taking of the fifth amendment
was made the ground for the suspension.4 Steinberg v. United States,
163 F. Supp. 590 (Ct. Cl. 1958). 5
1. 46 Stat. 468 (1930), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 691 (1952).
2. 68 Stat. 1142 (1954), 5 U.S.C. § 740d (Supp. V, 1958). The text, in part,
reads: "There shall not be paid to any person who has failed or refused, or fails or
refuses, prior to, on, or after Septerber 1, 1954, upon the ground of self-incrimination,
to appear, testify, or produce any book, paper, record, or other document, with respect to his service as an officer or employee of the Government or with respect to
any relationship which he has had or has with a foreign government, in any proceeding before a Federal grand jury, court of the United States, or congressional
committee, or to the survivor or beneficiary of such person, for any period subsequent to the date of such failure or refusal of such person or September 1, 1954, whichever is later, any annuity or retired pay on the basis of the service of such person
as an officer or employee of the Government."
3. 68 Stat. 1143 (1954), 5 U.S.C. § 740e (Supp. V, 1958).
4. The counterclaim by the United States was denied. The five member court
filed four opinions, one of them a dissent. The first opinion, in which two judges
concurred, relied upon the fact that suspension was based on the claiming of the
privilege and concluded also that Public Law 769 was a bill of attainder. For
recent analyses of the bill of attainder see Davis, United States v. Lovett and the
Attainder Bogy in Modern Legislation, 1950 WAsH. U.L.Q. 13; Wormuth, Legislative
Disqualifications as Bills of Attainder, 4 VAND. L. REv. 603 (1951). The second
opinion viewed the statute as either depriving plaintiff of a vested right, or as simply
barring payments to plaintiff but not his right to the pension. Under either interpretation plaintiff would be entitled to judgment. The third opinion took the
alternative positions that plaintiff bad a vested right which was extinguished in
violation of due process or that the statute was arbitrary, and therefore in violation
of due process. The dissenting judge concluded that there was no vested right and
that the statute was reasonable.
5. The Department of Justice was granted an extension of time in which to
perfect its appeal, but subsequently decided to abandon it. Letter From William P.
MacCracken, Jr., Counsel for the Plaintiff, to the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review, Jan. 9, 1959, on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania.
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In past cases the federal courts have espoused the theory that government pensions do not create "vested" rights in the potential recipients, 6
although an exception is recognized as to individual payments at the time
they fall due. 7 Carried to its logical extreme this theory leads to the conclusion that the government may make any modifications in its pensions
which it deems desirable subject only to the limitation that the action must
not be so arbitrary as to violate due process." However, the validity of
this theory as applied to the pension here in question is subject to some
doubt. 9 The origins of the doctrine lie in the period during which pensions
were given primarily to war veterans. 10 In that context, it was readily
apparent that congressional generosity arising out of the exultation of
victory might thereafter prove unduly burdensome. Policy considerations
thus favored permitting Congress to reduce or terminate the pensions,
particularly since the recipients had neither performed services in reliance
upon later drawing pensions nor made pecuniary contributions toward
them. When the expected difficulties occurred and Congress acted to reduce the outstanding promises, the courts had little difficulty in reasoning
that there was merely a promise of a gift, which, like any other promise
of a gift, was neither binding nor enforceable. • The factual situation has
changed materially, however, since the early veterans' cases. No longer
can government pensions be viewed as mere gratuities. Particularly under
the Civil Service Retirement Act," the pensions, or annuities, are in
reality a part of the fringe benefits extended to government employees.
They are a factor inducing people to accept government employment and
continue that employment as much as retirement plans, paid vacations,
and the like are in private industry1 2 Moreover, part of the cost of the
pensions are defrayed by periodic payments made by the pensioners themselves during their years of service. 13 The desire to keep the treasury
free from extensive binding commitments, of course, still exists. Thus some
balance between the conflicting goals of sustaining the expectancies of
government employees and avoiding undue restrictions on government
6. Dodge v. Board of Educ., 302 U.S. 74 (1937) (construction of a state
statute) ; Pennie v. Reis, 132 U.S. 464 (1889) (construction of a state statute);
United States v. Teller, 107 U.S. 64 (1882) ; Walton v. Cotton, 60 U.S. 355 (1857) ;
Rafferty v. United States, 210 F.2d 934 (3d Cir. 1954) ; MacLeod v. Fernandez, 101
F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 561 (1939); Lawrenson v. United
States, 153 F. Supp. 790 (Ct. Cl. 1957).
7. Rafferty v. United States, supra note 6; MacLeod v. Fernandez, supra
note 6; Lawrenson v. United States, supra note 6.
8. See note 20 infra and accompanying text.
9. It should be noted that the most recent Supreme Court pronouncement on this
issue was in 1937. Dodge v. Board of Educ., 302 U.S. 74 (1937). In that case the
issue was the construction of a state statute. See generally cases cited note 6 supra.
10. United States v. Teller, 107 U.S. 64 (1882) (disabled veterans); Walton v.
Cotton, 60 U.S. 355 (1857) (Revolutionary War officers).
11. 46 Stat. 468 (1930), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 691 (1952).
12. President's Committee on Civil Service Improvement, Report, H.R. Doc. No.
118, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 97, 98 (1941) ; Note, 56 COLUm. L. Rr. 251, 254 (1956);
99 U. PA. L. Rlv. 701, 703 (1951).
13. 46 Stat. 475 (1930), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 719 (1952).
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fiscal policies may be desirable. To continue the theory of the failure of
any rights to "vest" with the implications that arise from such a theory,
and to fail to consider the difference in underlying circumstances between
war veterans and employees, would appear to resolve the balance too
strongly against the employee. 14 Rather, the nature of government pensions today would seem to require that rights arising with respect to them
be determined more by analogy to cases involving government contracts
than to those involving pensions or bonuses to war veterans. While the
contracts clause of the Constitution in terms applies only to the states, 15
it has been held that fifth amendment due process protects the individual
contractor from government abrogation of its contracts. 16 There are
certain exceptions to this doctrine in cases in which the government expressly reserves the right to revoke or amend its contracts, 17 in certain
cases involving the war powers,' 8 and in the circumstances in which private
parties are relieved from liability on their contracts. 19 Absent such an
14. A number of states have attempted solutions to this problem. There are
three different positions as to when and how the right vests. One view is that
the right vests upon the acceptance of government employment. Bender v. Anglin,
207 Ga. 108, 60 S.E.2d 756, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 878 (1950); Cashman v.
Teacher's Retirement Bd., 193 Misc. 57, 84 N.Y.S.2d 142 (Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd,
275 App. Div. 906, 90 N.Y.S.2d 273 (1949), appeal denied, 275 App. Div. 998, 90
N.Y.S.2d 906 (1949), aff'd, 301 N.Y. 501, 93 N.E.2d 71 (1950) (pursuant to a
constitutional amendment); Payne v. Board of Trustees, 76 N.D. 278, 35 N.W.2d
553 (1949). The theory adopted by these courts is that the contract is formed by
the agreement of the employee, often compulsory, to contribute to the fund, and the
agreement by the government to pay the annuities upon the employee's fulfillment of
the necessary conditions. The second view is that the right vests upon retirement.
Klamm v. State, 235 Ind. 289, 126 N.E.2d 487 (1955); State ex rel. McLean v.
Retirement Bd., 161 Ohio St. 327, 119 N.E.2d 70 (1954); Hickey v. Pittsburgh
Pension Bd., 378 Pa. 300, 106 A.2d 233 (1954). The theory for this position is
that the pension is an offer for a unilateral contract which is accepted by the complete performance of the terms by the employee. Consequently, the offer can be
withdrawn at any time before it is accepted. However, under the current view of
contract law an offer of a unilateral contract contains a concurrent promise that the
offer will not be withdrawn during the period of performance that constitutes acceptance. RESTATEENT, CONTRACTS §45 (1932). The third view is that the right
vests upon the acceptance of government employment but is subject to reasonable
modification. Wallace v. Fresno, 42 Cal. 2d 180, 265 P.2d 884 (1954); Kern v.
Long Beach, 29 Cal. 2d 848, 179 P.2d 799 (1947). Although this result does not
coincide with any contractual theory, it does achieve some balance between the conflict of contract rights and sovereign power. See generally Note, 56 CoLuM. L. REV.
251 (1956) ; 99 U. PA. L. REv. 701 (1951).
15. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10.
16. See De La Rama S.S. Co. v. United States, 344 U.S. 386 (1953); Lynch v.
United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934); Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700 (1878); Ring
Constr. Corp. v. Secretary of War, 178 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
17. Lynch v. United States, supra note 16. Cf. Rudolph v. United States, 6 F2d
487 (D.C. Cir. 1925).
18. Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 788-89 (1948) ; Ring Constr. Corp. v.
Secretary of War, 178 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir. 1949). It is likewise true that the United
States, as sovereign, may refuse to permit suits against it on contracts it has validly
made. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934).
19. "When the United States enters into contract relations, its rights and duties
are governed generally by the law applicable to contracts between private individuals."
Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934).
Generally, judicial treatment of
private pensions has paralleled the state courts' treatments of government pensions
with more emphasis being placed upon employee contributions. Note, 56 CoLum. L.
REv. 251, 263-68 (1956).
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exception, if governmental pension rights are treated as analogous to
contracts with the government, abrogation of these rights through unilateral government action would not be permitted.
Public Law 769 may be invalid, however, even if governmental pension rights are considered no more than mere congressional generosity.
Even privileges and gratuities may be modified only so long as the change
is not so arbitrary as to violate due process. 20 In recent years the Supreme
Court has been presented with the problem of whether a refusal to testify
on the basis of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is
such an act that legislatures or government agencies may rely upon it as a
basis for dismissal from employment. In Lerner v. Casey 21 the Court
upheld a ruling of the New York Court of Appeals that a subway conductor was not deprived of due process when he was dismissed for refusing
on the basis of the privilege against self-incrimination to answer questions
asked by the New York Civil Service Commission concerning his membership in the Communist Party. The Court accepted the premise of the
New York court that "a finding of doubtful trust and reliability could
justifiably be based on appellant's lack of frankness." 2 2 Likewise, in
Beilan v. Board of Educ. 23 the Court held that a public school teacher's
dismissal for refusal on similar grounds to answer questions asked by the
Board of Education of Philadelphia pertaining to his Communist affiliations and activities did not violate due process. In so holding, the Court
accepted the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's interpretation of a Pennsylvania statute permitting discharge on grounds of "incompetency" as including "petitioner's 'deliberate and insubordinate refusal to answer the questions of his administrative superior in a vitally important matter pertaining
25
to his fitness.' " 24 On the other hand, in Slochower v. Board of Educ.
the Court held that a college professor employed by a city maintained
college was deprived of due process when he was dismissed for invoking
the privilege before a congressional committee. The Court attacked the
reasoning of the Board of Education that only two inferences could be
20. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518-19 (1958) (filing of loyalty oath as
basis of receiving state tax exemption held invalid as placing burden of proof of
freedom from criminal advocacy upon taxpayer); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S.
183, 192 (1952) (state statute requiring loyalty oath as condition of state employment held invalid on grounds that it included membership in organization without
knowledge of subversive purpose). Cf. Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716
(1951).
In an analogous situation-that of government employment-the Court stated:
"We need not pause to consider whether an abstract right to public employment exists.
It is sufficient to say that constitutional protection does extend to the public servant
whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory."
Wieman v. Updegraff, .rpraat 192.
21. 357 U.S. 468 (1958).
22. Id. at 476.
23. 357 U.S. 399 (1958).
24. Id. at 408.
25. 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
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drawn from the invocation of the privilege, guilt or perjury; and that of
the New York Court of Appeals which held that denial of the right to
invoke the privilege was merely a condition placed upon public employment. It stated that no "sinister" inference may be drawn from the claim
of the privilege, 26 and concluded that the practical effect of automatic
dismissal for the exercise of the privilege before the congressional committee was to draw an inference of guilt and to make the guilt the basis
of discharge. 27 It thus becomes clear from these cases that the government may properly inquire into the individual's qualifications for public
employment, and that refusal of the individual to respond to the inquiry
furnishes grounds for discharge. The Beilan and Lerner cases also stand
for the proposition that if a state government may act upon a refusal of the
individual to answer questions relevant to his employment, the use of the
privilege against self-incrimination as a basis for that refusal has no impact.2 8

However, if the dismissal is based upon inferences of guilt drawn

from the use of the privilege, or if the dismissal is pursuant to a statute
which makes the sole basis the use of the privilege, such a dismissal is
violative of the due process.2 9
Since the foregoing cases all involved inquiries by state governments,
the protection of the fifth amendment was not directly applicable. Even
assuming, however, that the powers permitted the federal government are
as great as those permitted the states in the Beilan and Lerner cases, the
instant case differs significantly. Here the government seeks not to discharge an individual currently employed, but to suspend the pension of
one whose employment has terminated. The plaintiff in the instant case
had already retired when the statute adding the new conditions for continuation of pension payments was passed. Granting that the government
has a legitimate interest in the qualifications of its employees, the effectuation of that interest would appear to have no bearing upon the question
of whether or not a retired employee is to receive pension payments. Doubt
as to the integrity of the individual may reflect upon his ability to perform
assigned duties. Once employment has ceased, however, the ability or its
lack becomes immaterial to the proper functioning of the agency involved.
A more acceptable justification in support of the statute may lie in the
argument that the governmental interest in full disclosure of the official
activities of its employees is sufficiently great as to make permissible the
threat of pension suspension as a means of bringing about that disclosure.
26. Id. at 557.
27. Id. at 558.
28. Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468, 477 (1958); Beilan v. Board of Educ., 357
U.S. 399, 405-06 (1958).
29. It is not at all clear that the distinction drawn between Slochower on the
one hand and Beilan and Lerner on the other hand is the basic one which the Court
will accept. The opinion in Beilan places the distinction on a question asked by a
congressional comnnittee as opposed to an agency of the local government. 357 U.S.
at 408-09. However, in Lerner the opinion would appear to rely more heavily upon
the use made of the claim of privilege, 357 U.S. at 476-77, although recognizing the
congressional committee-state agency distinction.

886

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 107

The balance between the individual's interest in his pension and the government's interest in the complete disclosure of its agents' activities has
not yet been resolved. It must be noted, however, that under this rationale
the disadvantage imposed on the individual cannot be justified as necessary
to remove from government employment one who has shown himself to be
of doubtful reliability. Rather, it is subject to attack as a penalty, similar
to a fine, imposed without provision for the procedural protections of the
Bill of Rights.30
Even assuming that the governmental interest present is sufficient
to permit Congress to predicate suspension of pension payments upon the
refusal of a retired employee to answer questions relating to his former
employment, an invalidating feature remains. The statute requires suspension not for refusal to testify, but for refusal to testify on the grounds
of the fifth amendment.31 Any governmental interest present would seem
neither to require nor to justify distinguishing between fifth amendment
refusals and other forms of recusancy. In effect, the statute makes the
taking of the fifth amendment, rather than the failure to respond to governmental inquiry, the grounds for the suspension. In this respect, it
appears arbitrary and discriminatory, and violative of due process on the
basis of the Slochower reasoning.
30. See generally Lovett v. United States, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), and authorities
cited note 4 supra.
31. See note 2 supra.

